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Summary
This report describes the emerging areas of information warfare and cyberwar
in the context of U.S. national security.  It assesses known U.S. capabilities and
plans, and suggests related policy issues of potential interest to Congress.  This report
will be updated to accommodate significant changes. 
Military planning is shifting away from the Cold War view that power is derived
from platforms, and more toward the view that combat power can be enhanced by
communications networks and technologies that control access to, and directly
manipulate information.  As a result, information itself is now both a tool and a target
of warfare.  
As concepts emerge, new uses of technology to disrupt the flow of information
to affect the ability or willingness of an adversary to fight is referred to by several
names: information warfare, cyberwar, and netwar.  The U.S. Department of Defense
uses the term “Information Operations,” and has grouped related activities into five
core capabilities: Psychological Operations, Military Deception, Operational
Security, Computer Network Operations, and Electronic Warfare.  Some weapons
used for IO are referred to as “non-kinetic,” and include high power microwave
(HPM) or directed electromagnetic energy weapons (EMP) that, in short pulses, can
overpower and permanently degrade computer circuitry, or in other applications, can
cause temporary physical discomfort. 
Several public policy issues that Congress may choose to consider include
whether the United States should:
! encourage or discourage international arms control for
cyberweapons, as other nations increase their cyber capabilities;
! modify U.S. cyber-crime legislation to conform to international
agreements that make it easier to track and find cyber attackers;
! engage in covert psychological operations affecting audiences within
friendly nations;
! encourage or discourage the U.S. military to rely on the civilian
commercial infrastructure to support part of its communications,
despite vulnerabilities to threats from possible high-altitude
electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) or cyber attack;
! create new regulation to hasten improvements to computer security
for the nation’s privately-owned critical infrastructure; or
! prepare for possible legal issues should the effects of offensive U.S.
military cyberweapons, or electromagnetic pulse weapons spread to
accidentally disable critical civilian computer systems, or disrupt
systems located in other non-combatant countries.
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Information Warfare and Cyberwar:
Capabilities and Related Policy Issues
Introduction
Background
Control of information has always been part of military operations, and new
technologies now offer some important strategic advantages.  New electronic and
computer technologies enable the U.S. military to link remote sensors to decision
makers and combat personnel in order to (1) create a higher level of shared
awareness, (2) better synchronize command, control, and intelligence, and (3)
translate information superiority into combat power.  In addition to a nuclear
deterrence, the U.S. Strategic Command  reportedly now sees electronic warfare used
to disable an adversary’s computers, psychological warfare used to manipulate an
adversary’s perception, and other components of information warfare as major tools
for deterring attacks in the future.1
However, new uses of technology for information warfare also create new
national security vulnerabilities and new policy issues, including (1) possible
international arms control for cyberweapons; (2) international cooperation for pursuit
of cyber terrorists and other cyber attackers; (3) psychological operations affecting
friendly nations; (4) possible national security vulnerabilities resulting from military
dependence on the civilian computer infrastructure and computer software products;
(5) the need to raise the computer security awareness of the civilian community; and
(6) possible accusations of war crimes if offensive military cyberweapons severely
disrupt critical civilian computer systems, or systems of other non-combatant nations.
Purpose
This report describes Department of Defense capabilities for conducting military
information warfare operations, and gives an overview of related policy issues.
Topics such as computer crime, disruption of financial organizations, digital piracy
of intellectual property, and Internet industrial espionage provide examples of areas
where civilian infrastructure vulnerabilities may be targeted by military information
warfare operations. These topic areas are numerous, and this report limits discussion
to only a few.  
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Definitions
Information
Information is a resource created from two things: phenomena (data) that are
observed, plus the instructions (systems) required to analyze and interpret the data
to give it meaning.  The value of information is enhanced by technology such as
sensors, computers, networks, and databases.  
In previous warfare, adversaries indirectly influenced the information of an
adversary (e.g., by dropping dummies from airplanes to simulate attack by live
paratroopers or by sending false messages intended for interception), so as to
mislead.2   However, with current digital technology, opponents can now act directly
upon the stored bits that comprise the actual information itself.
Information Warfare
The Department of Defense (DOD) technical view of information warfare is that
information itself is now a realm, a weapon, and a target.  An information-based
attack includes any unauthorized attempt to copy data, or directly alter data or
instructions.  Information warfare involves much more than computers and computer
networks.  It is comprised of operations directed against information in any form,
transmitted over any media, including operations against information content, its
supporting systems and software, the physical hardware device that stores the data
or instructions, and also human practices and perceptions. 3 
DOD Information Operations
The DOD term for military information warfare is “Information Operations”
(IO).  IO is conducted during time of crisis or conflict to affect adversary information
and information systems while defending one’s own information and systems.4  
IO during a time of conflict, is any attack intended to disrupt or exploit an
information system or information flow, regardless of the means.  An attack may use
information as a weapon to create deception, or influence the psychology of an
adversary, or an attack may disrupt the electrical circuits that support an information
system.  Therefore, IO enables the U.S. military to influence an adversary’s will to
fight while also protecting our forces and our will.  
Examples may include (1) using leaflets or broadcasts to influence opinions and
actions of a target audience, (2) creating false appearances of military strength or
weakness to mislead an adversary, (3) blocking access to information that might
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9, 1995 [http://www.af.mil/lib/corner.html].
6 For more information, see CRS Report RL32238, Defense Transformation: Background
and Oversight Issues for Congress.
7 For more information, see CRS Report RL32411, Network Centric Warfare: Background
and Oversight Issues for Congress.
prove useful to an adversary, (4) sending malicious computer programs to attack and
disrupt adversary computer software, and (5) creating directed energy
electromagnetic pulses to disrupt or destroy targeted military computer hardware or
networks.  
Bombing a telephone switch facility, or short-circuiting the telephone switch
network, or destroying only the telephone switch facility software, are all examples
of information warfare. Other terms such as knowledge-based war, cyberwar,
netwar, command and control war, and electronic warfare are sometimes used
interchangeably with information warfare.5
Information Superiority
The administration has stated that DOD must transform to achieve a
fundamentally joint force capable of rapid decision superiority.6  Decision Superiority
is the DOD term used to describe a competitive advantage in the cognitive realm, that
is facilitated by Information Superiority.  Information Superiority is a DOD term that
describes a competitive advantage that enables a military commander to surprise and
out maneuver an enemy.  Information Superiority supports better coordination of
battlefield units, and enables each individual battlefield commander to make better-
informed decisions more quickly than an adversary.  DOD Information Operations
capabilities help achieve Information Superiority leading to Decision Superiority, and
also help support information age battlefield concepts related to Network Centric
Warfare.7
DOD Information Operations Capabilities
DOD has identified five core capabilities for conduct of information operations
(IO); (a) Psychological Operations, (b) Military Deception, (c) Operations Security,
(d) Computer Network Operations, and (e) Electronic Warfare.  These IO capabilities
are intended to influence foreign decision makers and protect friendly decision-
making, and to affect or defend the electromagnetic spectrum, information systems,
and information that supports decision makers, weapon systems, command and
control, and automated responses.  Other observers have included additional
capabilities for IO: Counterintelligence and Public Affairs capabilities as part of
Influence Operations; and, Electronic Attack, Electronic Protect, and non-lethal
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8 Air Force, Operation Iraqi Freedom Information Operations Lessons Learned: First Look,
AFC2ISRC/CX, July 23, 2003 [http://www.cadre.maxwell.af.mil/warfarestudies/
iwac/Downloads/IW250%20Reading.doc].
9  DOD Dictionary of Military Terms [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/].
10 Air Force, Operation Iraqi Freedom Information Operations Lessons Learned: First
Look, AFC2ISRC/CX, July 23, 2003 [http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/data_extra/
pdf3/dplus2004_265.pdf].
11 “Presidential Documents, Title 3 - The President - Establishing the Office of Global
Communications,” Federal Register, Vol. 68, no. 16, Jan. 24, 2003.
12 OGC has been up and running since July 2002, working to get the Administration’s
message out to foreign news media outlets.  Tucker Eskew stated that, “(The President)
knows that we need to communicate our policies and values to the world with greater clarity
and through dialogue with emerging voices around the globe.” Scott Lindlaw, “New Office
Aims to Bolster U.S. Image,” AP Online, Feb. 11, 2003.
suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capabilities as part of Electronic Combat.8
The five DOD core capabilities for IO are described below.
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)
PSYOPS is defined by DOD as planned operations to convey selected
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives,
objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is
to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s
objectives.9  For example, during the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), leaflets were
dropped carrying the official message, “Any war is not against the Iraqi people, but
is to disarm Mr. Hussein and end his government.”  Similar broadcast messages were
sent from Air Force EC-130E aircraft, and from Navy ships operating in the Persian
Gulf.  U.S. forces also sent a barrage of email, faxes, and cell phone calls to
numerous Iraqi leaders encouraging them to abandon support for Saddam Hussein.
However, the Al Jazeera news network, based in Qatar, currently beams its
messages to over 35 million viewers in the Middle East, and is considered by many
to be a market competitor for U.S. Psyops.  Some observers have stated that the U.S.
will continue to lose ground in the global media wars until it develops a coordinated
strategic communications strategy to counter Al Jazeera.10 
Executive Order 13283, signed by President George W. Bush on January 21,
2003, established  within the White house the Office of Global Communications
(OGC).11   The Executive Order states that the new office is authorized to send teams
of “communicators” to “areas of high global interest and media attention.”  It is
currently studying ways to reach Muslim audiences directly through radio and TV,
to counter anti-American sentiments.  The new office will not use disinformation, but
reportedly will shine a light on disinformation by others.12
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Military Deception (MILDEC)
Deception guides an enemy into making mistakes by presenting false
information, images, or statements. MILDEC is defined as actions executed to
deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers with regard to friendly
military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take
specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the success of the friendly
military operation.  For example, by dropping dummy figures resembling parachutists
from airplanes at night, an enemy might be tricked into moving or rearranging their
forces to ward off a false attack.
As an example of deception during OIF, Iraqi forces often hid weapons and
munitions inside schools, mosques and private homes.  Many tons of military
equipment, including airplanes, were also found buried beneath the Iraqi sand.  Also,
during OIF, the Navy deployed the Tactical Air Launched Decoy system to divert
fire from Iraqi air defenses away from real combat aircraft.
Operational Security (OPSEC)
OPSEC is defined as a process of identifying and analyzing information that is
critical to friendly operations to; (a) identify which information can be observed by
adversary intelligence systems, (b) determine indicators that hostile intelligence
systems might piece together to derive critical information in time to be useful to
adversaries, and (c) select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce the
vulnerability of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.  For example, during OIF,
US forces were warned to remove certain publicly available information from DOD
websites, so that Iraqi forces could not exploit sensitive but unclassified information.
OPSEC is closely related to Information Assurance (IA), which the business
community refers to as “computer security”.  However OPSEC differs from IA
because it does not include planning for business recovery after a disaster.
Computer Network Operations (CNO)
Computer Network Operations are comprised of two specific yet
complementary mission areas; Computer Network Defense and Computer Network
Attack.13  CNO involves the ability to attack and disrupt enemy computer networks,
protect military information systems, and exploit enemy computer networks through
intelligence collection. CNO is outlined in DOD Directive 3600.1 “Information
Operations,” and is composed of methods for attack, defense and exploitation of
information. 
Computer Network Attack (CNA).  CNA is defined as operations to disrupt,
deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks,
or the computers and networks themselves.  CNA relies on interpreted signals in a
data stream to execute an attack, while Electronic Warfare relies more on the power
CRS-6
14 Air Force, Operation Iraqi Freedom Information Operations Lessons Learned: First
Look, AFC2ISRC/CX, July 23, 2003 [http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/data_extra/
pdf3/dplus2004_265.pdf].
of electromagnetic energy. The following are examples of each type of operation;
sending a digital signal stream through a network to a central processing unit that
instructs the controller to interrupt the power supply is CNA, while sending a high
voltage surge through the electrical power cable to short out the power supply is
Electronic Warfare.  
Computer Network Defense (CND).  CND is defined as defensive
measures to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from
disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction.  It utilizes security measures that seek
to keep the enemy from learning about U.S. military capabilities and intentions.
CND includes actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to
unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and networks.  Defensive
information warfare involves measures intended to prevent, detect, and subvert an
enemy’s direct, or indirect, actions against our information systems.  CND focuses
on detecting or stopping intrusions, whereas OPSEC focuses on  identifying and
reducing possible vulnerabilities or exposures that might benefit an intruder.
During OIF there were no reported successful penetrations of DOD systems
attributable to Iraqi forces.14  
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE).   CNE is an area of Information
Operations that is not yet clearly defined within DOD.  Information exploitation
involves espionage, that in the case of IO, is usually performed through network tools
that penetrate adversary systems to return information or copies of files that singly,
or collectively, enable the military to gain an advantage over the adversary.  Tools
used for CNE are similar to those used for CNA, but configured for different
objectives.  
While CNA by itself may be considered qualitatively an act of war, it would
usually precede a period of careful and covert CNE to determine possible
vulnerabilities of an adversary’s computers and networks as a first step toward
launching a CNA operation.  In addition, CND is made more effective if an
adversary’s technical capabilities are known in advance, or if the origin of suspected
probes against U.S. computers can be accurately determined.  CNE is also used to
acquire this information.  Therefore, reconnaissance, probing, and scanning of an
adversary’s computers and networks may all be used as part of CNA and CND. 
Electronic Warfare (EW)
EW is defined as any military action involving the direction or control of
electromagnetic spectrum energy to deceive or attack the enemy.  EW has been an
important component of military air operations since the earliest days of radar, and
engineers and scientists have evolved the concepts to now include new stealth
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techniques.15  High power electromagnetic energy can also be used as a tool to
overload or disrupt the circuitry of electronic equipment.  For example, a nuclear, or
specially-designed chemical explosion, can generate a strong electromagnetic pulse.
A short energy pulse may not necessarily be directly harmful to humans or physical
structures, however, it can overload or destroy nearby electronic devices, such as
computers, radios, telephones, and almost anything that uses transistors, circuits, and
wiring.  
EW can also take the form of a passive activity, such as location, interception,
and analysis of enemy radar signals so vulnerabilities can be identified and exploited.
As an example of EW, on one occasion during OIF, the Iraqis employed 6 GPS
jammers, intended to confuse the targeting systems of U.S. weaponry.  However,
within 2 nights, all jamming stations were destroyed by combat aircraft, using the
jamming signals to help direct weapons onto the Iraqi targets.16
Cyberweapons, Non-Kinetic Weapons, and
Electronic Warfare 
IO activities include (a) attempts to infiltrate networks, (b) attempts to steal or
sabotage information, and (c) attempts to paralyze high technology systems.  Tools
for conducting these operations include cyberweapons, which are computer programs
capable of disrupting the data storage or processing logic of enemy computers.  Other
IO tools used for Electronic Warfare include weapons capable of jamming,
overpowering, or degrading enemy communications, telemetry, or circuitry.  “Non-
kinetic” is a term that is sometimes used to describe the group of non-explosive
weapons with the above capabilities.  This includes some weapons designed to emit
directed electromagnetic energy that, in short pulses, may disable computer circuitry,
or in other applications, may cause temporary physical discomfort.  
For example, rather than using explosives, a non-kinetic weapon might disable
an approaching enemy missile by directing a High Power Microwave (HPM) beam
that burns out the circuitry and stops its attack capability, or by sending a false
telemetry signal that misdirects the targeting computer.17  Currently, a reusable
directed-energy weapon is being designed for use on the Joint Unmanned Combat Air
System, which could remain stealthy and airborne for extended periods while
repeatedly focusing energy beams to disable numerous targets.  Also, in a different
application, a microwave weapon has been tested that can be used for controlling or
CRS-8
18 David Ruppe, “Directed-Energy Weapons: Possible U.S. Use Against Iraq Could Threaten
International Regimes,” Global Security Newswire, August 16, 2002 [http://www.
globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020816-dew.htm] .
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Fulghum, “Sneak Attack,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 28, 2004, p. 34.
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dispersing crowds without killing people.  This weapon reportedly causes a painful
burning sensation on the skin, but no long-term damage.18
During OIF, many Iraqi command bunkers and suspected chemical-biological
weapons bunkers were deeply buried underground and proved difficult to disable
using conventional explosives.  However, new HPM weapons were reportedly
considered for possible use in attacks against these targets because the numerous
communications and power lines leading into the underground bunkers offered
pathways for conducting powerful surges of electromagnetic energy that could
destroy the computer equipment inside.19 
Cyberweapons include (a) offensive attack tools, such as viruses, Trojan horses,
denial-of-service attack tools; (b) “dual use” tools, such as port vulnerability
scanners, and network monitoring tools; and, (c) defensive tools, such as encryption
and firewalls.  Offensive tools are associated with computer network attack (CNA)
directed against an enemy’s network, while defensive tools are used mainly to protect
against attack.  Dual-use tools are used either offensively or defensively, depending
on the intention of the user.  Recent military IO programs tested the capability for
U.S. forces to secretly enter an enemy computer network and monitor what their
radar systems could detect.  Further experiments tested the added capability for U.S.
forces to take over the enemy computers and start manipulating their radar to show
false images.20  
During OIF, U.S. and coalition forces reportedly did not carry out
comprehensive computer network attacks against Iraqi systems.  Even though
comprehensive IO plans were prepared in advance, several DOD officials reportedly
stated that top-level approval for several computer attack missions was not granted
until it was too late to carry them out to help achieve war objectives.21  U.S. forces
reportedly may have rejected launching a planned cyber attack against Iraqi financial
computers because Iraq’s banking network is connected to a financial
communications network located in Europe.  According to Pentagon sources, an
information warfare attack directed at Iraq might also have brought down banks and
ATM machines located in parts of Europe as well.  Such global network
interconnections, plus close network links between Iraqi military computer systems
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and the civilian infrastructure, reportedly frustrated attempts by U.S. forces to design
a cyber attack that would be limited to military targets only in Iraq.22  
Cyberweapons are becoming easier to obtain, easier to use, and more powerful.
In a 1999 study, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) found
that many newer attack tools, available on the Internet, can now easily penetrate most
networks, and  many others are effective in penetrating firewalls and attacking
Internet routers.  Other tools allow attacks to be launched by simply typing the
Internet address of a designated target directly into the attack-enabling website.23 
Current DOD Command Structure for Information
Operations
The U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), a unified combatant
command, is the command and control center for U.S. strategic forces and controls
military space operations, computer network operations, information operations,
strategic warning and intelligence assessments as well as global strategic operations
planning.  Within USSTRATCOM, the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC)
has responsibility for managing information warfare activities, including the
integration of operations security, psychological operations, military deception, and
electronic warfare throughout the planning and execution phases of the operations.24
Within the JIOC, the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO),
coordinates and directs the defense of DOD computer systems and networks, and,
when directed, conducts computer network attack in support of combatant
commanders’ and national objectives.25 
As the U.S. military increasingly builds up its computer network infrastructure
through the Global Information Grid, DOD reportedly wants the command structure
to better reflect the importance of computer network operations.  The new JTF-GNO
handles both network defense and network management.  JTF-GNO exercises
operational control of the Global Information Grid (GIG) for Network Operations
issues which may potentially affect availability, protection, or delivery of information
for multiple combatant commands, services, or agencies.  JTF-GNO has
responsibility to ensure that GIG services are always available to the warfighter. JTF-
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GNO merges with the Global Network Operations and Security Center, the DoD
Computer Emergency Response Team, and the Global SATCOM Support Center to
for a single entity called the Global NetOps Center (GNC). The GNC is the technical
implementation arm of JTF-GNO, and the nerve center for DOD global network
operations.26 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (PL108-136)
authorizes appropriations for FY2004 military activities.  Under this law, the
Secretary of Defense is directed to submit to the congressional defense committees
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on the preparation
for and conduct of military operations under Operation Iraqi Freedom from March
19, 2003, to May 1, 2003, including the effectiveness of information operations and
a description of technological and any restrictions on the use of psychological
operations capabilities.  As of the date of this publication, the above report has not
yet been made available.
Guidelines for DOD use of Cyberweapons
In February 2003, the Bush administration announced plans to develop national-
level guidance for determining when and how the United States would launch
computer network attacks against foreign adversary computer systems.  The
guidance, known as National Security Presidential Directive 16 (classified), was
signed in July 2002, and is intended to clarify circumstances under which an attack
would be justified, and who has authority to launch a computer attack. 
In a meeting held in January 2003, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
White House officials sought input from experts outside government on guidelines
for use of cyberweapons.  Officials have stated they are proceeding cautiously, since
a cyberattack could have serious cascading effects, perhaps causing major disruption
to civilian systems in addition to the intended military computer targets.27  
Policy Issues
Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: 
! possible effects of international arms control for cyberweapons; 
! the need for international cooperation for pursuit of cyber terrorists
and other cyber attackers; 
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! use of psychological operations that may affect friendly nations; 
! possible national security vulnerabilities resulting from military
dependence on the civilian computer infrastructure; 
! the need to raise the computer security awareness of the civilian
population, and;
! possible legal issues resulting from U.S. military use of
cyberweapons that may also disable critical civilian computer
systems, or computer systems in other countries.
International Arms Control for Cyberweapons
Malicious computer code that attacks information systems may in theory be
treated as a weapon of war within the scope of the laws of armed conflict, and
attempts are now being made by some international organizations to classify and
control malicious computer code.28   Should the United States adopt a position to
encourage or discourage international controls for weapons in cyberspace, as other
nations, such as Iraq and China, increase their cyber capabilities? 
DOD has not yet developed a policy regarding international controls for
cyberweapons, however, the United States remains concerned about future
capabilities for foreign nations to develop their own effective capabilities for
computer espionage and computer network attack.29  Officials have reportedly stated
that other nations, rather than terrorist groups, pose the biggest threat to U.S.
computer networks.30  For example, the Chinese military is enhancing its information
warfare capabilities, according to the Defense Department’s annual report to
Congress on China’s military prowess.31  The report finds that China is placing
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specific emphasis on the ability to perform information operations designed to
weaken an enemy force’s command and control systems.32 
International Cooperation for Pursuit of Cyber Attackers
An emerging issue is whether the United States should pursue international
agreements to harmonize cyber-crime legislation, and also deter cyber-crime through
tougher criminal penalties.  It is often technically difficult to trace back to the source
of a computer attack, because an attacker can hide their location by hopping from one
computer system to another, sometimes taking a path that connects networks and
computers in many different countries.  Pursuit to identify the attacker involves a
trace back through networks that may require the cooperation of computer systems
administrators or Internet Service Providers in the different nations involved.
Sometimes, computer network defense also requires the use of computer espionage
to determine whether an adversary has been sending out computer probes in
preparation for launching a follow-on attack.  In either case, the technical problems
of pursuit or detection are made increasingly complex if one or more of the nations
involved has a legal policy or political ideology that conflicts with that of the United
States.33  
The Administration has encouraged United States adoption of the Council of
Europe Cybercrime Treaty.34  This Treaty would require participating nations to
update their laws to reflect computer crimes such as unauthorized intrusions into
networks, the release of worms and viruses, and copyright infringement.  The Treaty
also includes arrangements for mutual assistance and extradition among participating
nations.  As of the date of this report, the Treaty has been ratified by Albania,
Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Romania.  
The Administration has stated that the Treaty will help deny a safe haven to
criminals and terrorists who can cause damage to U.S. interests from abroad using
computer systems.35  However, while some observers say that international
cooperation is important for defending against cyber attacks and improving global
cybersecurity, others point out that the Treaty also contains a questionable addition
that would require nations to imprison anyone guilty of “insulting publicly, through
a computer system” certain groups of people based on characteristics such as race or
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ethnic origin.   The U.S. Department of Justice has stated that such an addition would
violate of the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of expression.  The Electronic
Privacy Information Center has  also objected to the addition, saying that it would
“would create invasive investigative techniques while failing to provide meaningful
privacy and civil liberties safeguards.”36
In November 2003, the Administration submitted the Treaty to the U.S. Senate
for ratification.  On June 17, 2004, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held
a hearing to discuss the Treaty.  As of the date of this report, the Treaty has not yet
been ratified by a two thirds vote of the Senate.
Psychological Operations Affecting Friendly Nations 
When targeting hostile countries, PSYOPS can include broadcasting from
airborne radio and television stations, or dropping leaflets.  Psychological operations
also include routine public relations work to increase civilian support in friendly
nations like Colombia, the Philippines, or Bosnia, whose governments have
sometimes relied on American troops.37
An apparent issue is whether the Department of Defense is legislatively
authorized to engage in covert psychological operations involving friendly nations,
and whether any such operations would likely prove to be counterproductive.38 
DOD Directive 3600.1 is the current guide for U.S. military Information
Operations.39  However, in early December 2002 media reports indicated that DOD
personnel had drafted what some described as a “secret amendment” to Directive
3600.1, involving covert operations that would influence public opinion and policy
makers in friendly and neutral countries.  The proposed 2002 amendment reportedly
suggested that PSYOPS funds might be used to publish stories favorable to American
policies, or hire outside contractors without obvious ties to the Pentagon to organize
rallies in support of Administration policies.  Press reports suggested that the
proposal was designed to counter the influence of organizations that allegedly had
developed into breeding grounds for Islamic militancy and anti-Americanism in
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certain areas of the Middle East, Asia, and Europe.40   However, since December
2002, DOD has reportedly stepped back from this proposal, leaving the Department
of State and CIA with responsibility for strategic PSYOPS.41  
The new Office of Global Communications, created in January, 2003 by
Executive Order 13283, was established to promote the spread of truthful and
accurate messages to others about U.S. policy, and avoid disinformation.42   The new
OGC office replaces an earlier effort, terminated by the administration, to build
public support overseas for the war on terrorism.43  OGC has coordinated themes
calling for the disarmament of Saddam Hussein, and the office also coordinated
efforts to reveal disinformation and propaganda coming from the Iraqi regime,
through distributing publications such as “Apparatus of Lies: Saddam’s
Disinformation and Propaganda, 1990-2003.”  Currently, OGC is working with the
Department of State to improve worldwide communications about U.S. humanitarian
and pro-democracy efforts.
Military Dependence on Satellites and the Civilian
Infrastructure
Does increased short-term flexibility outweigh apparent security vulnerabilities
while DOD continues to rely on parts of the civilian communications infrastructure?
Cyber attacks44, or attacks by high-altitude45 or other high-energy electromagnetic
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pulse (EMP) weapons that are directed against civilian computers46 may slow or
disable the Internet, or other parts of the civilian communications infrastructure, and
may also reduce the effectiveness of some DOD information warfare capabilities. 
The U.S. military typically uses its Non-Classified IP Router Network
(NIPRNET) for administrative operations, while its Secret IP Router Network
(SIPRNET) allows military staff to access classified databases and conduct secure
messaging.   Seventy percent of NIPRNET traffic is reportedly directed toward the
civilian Internet, while SIPRNET traffic has traditionally been isolated from the
civilian Internet.47  Also, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) reported
that up to 84 percent of satellite communications bandwidth provided to the
Operation Iraqi Freedom theater was supplied by commercial satellites.  DOD has
reportedly become the single largest customer for commercial satellite services.48
Therefore, security for part of DOD communications may depend on the level of
security found in civilian computers and software49, and the global commercial
communications infrastructure. 
Today’s high technology military systems increasingly rely on the constellation
of Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, creating a potential vulnerability for
U.S. and allied warfighters should GPS signals be degraded or denied.  GPS
jamming, or corruption of the telemetry signal, could reduce weapon accuracy,
resulting in delays in finding targets, an increase in collateral damage, and, in the
worst case, fratricide.  However, the technologies needed to create a threat to GPS
are within the grasp of virtually any nation, and therefore a significant threat could
be fielded quickly and inexpensively.50  The FY2005 budget estimate for R&D for
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GPS engineering studies and test and evaluation for upgrades and improvements is
$40.568 million.51
Need to Raise Computer Security Awareness within U.S.
Private Sector
The new National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace52, published February 2003,
states that the private sector now has a crucial role in protecting national security
because it largely runs the nation’s critical infrastructure.53  Richard Clarke, former
chairman of the CIPB, has also stated that the nation’s critical infrastructure is
vulnerable because cyber-attackers could possibly use the millions of home and
business PCs, that are poorly protected against malicious code, to launch debilitating
assaults on the nation’s critical infrastructure.  The plan urges home and small
business computer users to install firewalls and anti-virus software, and calls for a
public-private dialogue to devise ways that the government can reduce the burden of
security on home users and businesses.  
However, some observers in the private sector feel the plan does not do enough
to ensure that companies will adopt sound security practices, and question whether
regulation is needed to supplement, or replace market forces.54  For example, the plan
has been strongly criticized by the congressionally appointed Advisory Panel to
Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction, chaired by former Virginia Gov. James S. Gilmore III.  In its fourth
annual publication, the Gilmore Report indicates that public/private partnerships and
market forces are not working to protect national security in cyberspace.  The
Gilmore Report faults the National Strategy Plan for relying too heavily on
persuasion to get the private sector to act, and for not holding managers accountable
for improving cybersecurity for the systems they own and operate.55  
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Possible Legal Issues Resulting From Use of High Energy
Weapons and Cyberweapons
If offensive information warfare operations are ever employed, a lack of precise
control over cyberweapons or high energy weapons might involve the U.S. in
violations of international law.  The effects of using cyberweapons or
electromagnetic pulse weapons, if widespread and severe, could arguably exceed
customary rules of military conflict, also known as the laws of war.56 
 
The effects from United States use of offensive electromagnetic pulse weapons,
high-power microwave weapons, and cyberweapons may be difficult to limit or
control.  Firing electromagnetic weapons may sometimes be physically dangerous to
nearby U.S. forces, if they are not properly shielded against the effects of
electromagnetic radiation.  For example, possible side effects of prolonged exposure
to high power microwaves reportedly may cause equipment operators, or other
soldiers nearby to experience symptoms of pain, erratic heartbeat, fatigue, weakness,
nose bleeds, headaches, or disorientation.57  The effects of a directed energy weapon
attack against enemy military forces may be widespread enough to also disable
nearby critical civilian or medical electronic equipment, such as heart pace-makers,
or hospital incubators.  Similarly, if a computer attack program accidentally spreads
through the Internet, it may severely affect other critical non-military computers,
possibly the civilian systems that control electricity, water sanitation, or emergency
communications.  The effects might spread further to affect critical systems in other
non-combatant countries.  Also, if hackers are able to subsequently copy and reverse-
engineer a military computer attack program, it could be used by terrorists against
other countries, or even turned against the civilian computer systems in the United
States.58 
 
The responsibility for protecting the computer-controlled critical infrastructure
of the United States against a cyber attack has fallen to each individual federal
agency, and to industry owners of the infrastructure.  Some maintain that a much
more coordinated approach to nationwide computer security may be needed to protect
against threats from information warfare attacks.
CRS-18
Current Legislation
H.R. 4200, which authorizes appropriations for FY2005 for DOD military
activities, was introduced in the House on April 22, 2004.  The bill was
amended by the House Committee on Armed Services on May 14, 2004, and
reported in House Report 109-491.  A supplemental report was filed on May 20,
2004, as House Report 108-491, Part II.  On June 23, the Senate required an
amendment, and on June 24, requested a conference to resolve differences.
